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BASIC  THEORY
Francois  Quesnay,  founder  of  the  Physiocratic  school  of  econo-
mists  in  France  200  years  ago,  was  the  original  agricultural  policy
economist.  His  Tableau Economique or  his  conception  of  desirable
national  agricultural  policy,  published  in  1758,  is  still  the  point  of
view  of  many  American  farmers  who  complain  that the  middlemen,
manufacturers,  and  urban  residents  take  so  much  from  their  product
that  they  cannot  keep  up  the  improvements  and  fertility  of  their  soil
and must eventually  abandon  their farms and move to the  cities.
To him, only agriculture  was productive,  and all other occupations
were  sterile.  Money  was  not  real  wealth.  The  true  value  of  a  com-
modity  was  not  its  power  to  command  money  in  exchange,  but  its
power  to  command  other  commodities  in  exchange.  In  effect,  there-
fore, he was  the first advocate  of a farm  parity concept.
He  believed,  however,  that  one  bushel  of wheat  had  just as  much
value in  exchange for other commodities  as  any other bushel of wheat
regardless  of the total  supply available.  In  this, he  confused  use value
with  exchange  value.  His  view  in  this  respect  was  no different  from
that of many people  today who argue  that there  is not  and  never was
such  a  thing  as  agricultural  overproduction.
Eventually,  Quesnay  saw  his error.  In  eliminating  the  mercantilist
fallacy  of  a  foreign  balance  of trade  designed to  increase  the  nation's
supply  of  precious  metals,  he  had  fallen  victim  to another  fallacy  of
assuming  that  a  nation  could  continue  increasing  its  supply  of  agri-
cultural  commodities  without  reducing  their  exchange  value  in  terms
of other  commodities.  His  eventual  recognition  of this  fallacy  led him
in  1765  to  a practical  abandonment  of his earlier  distinction  between
productive  and  sterile  classes.  Thus,  Quesnay  and  his  followers  per-
formed  a great  service  to  economic  theory  by getting  behind the com-
mon-sense notions  of use value and showing that the scarcity or market
value  of  a  commodity  is  its  power  to  command  other commodities  in
exchange.  The  changing  exchange  value  of  farm  commodities  gives
rise  to  modern  agricultural  policy  issues,  and  will  certainly  continue
to do so  in the future.
178PAST  AND  PRESENT  ISSUES
Just fifteen years ago the major agricultural  policy questions  of the
nation  involved  rationing,  price  ceilings,  production  goals,  and  how
to  deal  with  wartime  shortages  of  agricultural  products.  But  behind
these  questions  was  an  abiding  concern  about  how  we  might  make
the  transition  from  war  to  peace  without  the  customary  farm  price
collapse.  We  had  already  passed  the  Steagall  Amendment  to  provide
price-support  incentives  for  an expanded  production,  and  to  provide
a  cushion  against  possible  price  declines  for  two  years  after the  war.
No  one  at that  time  fully  anticipated  the  26  percent  growth  in
population  that  occurred between  1944 and  1958.  Much less did any-
one  foresee  the  even  greater  increase  in  agricultural  production  that
took  place during  the  same  period.  Having  emerged  from the  depres-
sion period with its mass unemployment,  all of us were convinced that
our farm problem would  be solved if we could  only create  an economy
of  "full  employment."  Yet,  during  much  of  the  past  fifteen years  we
have  actually  had  a  continuing  farm  problem  in  the  face  of  at least
"high  level"  employment.
Only ten years  ago we were  in the midst of a debate about how we
could  stem  the then  sharp  decline of  farm income.  A  short five  years
ago  we  were  getting  ready  for the  soil  bank-the  acreage  reserve  fea-
ture  of  which  is  already  history.  The  major  questions  today  are  the
issues  of how  to  get  rid  of surpluses  already  produced,  how  to  avoid
continuous  production  of new  surpluses,  and  how to  help farmers  at
reasonable  cost to the  government.
The  past  fifteen  years  have  brought  major  changes  in  the  main
policy  questions  concerning  agriculture.  We  can  safely  predict  that
the  next fifteen  will do likewise, though none  of us  can know precisely
what the changes will be.
Even so,  the major  agricultural policy questions  of the next fifteen
years will all  stem partly from past action or inaction-they  will repre-
sent  in part the consequences  of past policies  as  they  unfold in action.
The  record  of  the  past  shows  clearly  that  what  we  generally  regard
as  major  agricultural policy  questions  are  politico-economic  questions
-not  what the economists  are prone to call purely economic  questions,
i.e.,  those concerning optimum allocation of resources.  Especially  since
1920,  the  major politico-economic  questions  in  peacetime  have  been
generally  concerned  with:  (1)  farm income and prices,  (2)  the identi-
fication  and  definition  of agricultural  surpluses,  and  (3)  politico-eco-
nomic  decisions  regarding  what  should  be  done  about  problems  in
these  areas.
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We  are practitioners  in the field  of economics-not  politics.  There-
fore,  we speak  primarily of the economic  side of our  future problems.
And  if we  are  allowed  to  "pull  the teeth"  of the real  major  uncertain-
ties  such  as  war  and  peace,  and  to  assume  nothing  worse  than  small
"brush-fire"  wars,  along  with  continuing  high-level  employment  and
expanding  economic  activity,  we  may  be  able  to  foresee  some  of  the
likely  over-all  agricultural  policy  problems  of  the  next  fifteen  years.
These  appear to me to be as follows:
1.  The continuing  imbalance  between farm and  nonfarm income,
both  per  person  and  in  total.
2.  The  rural  poverty  issues  concerning  mainly  low-income
farmers.
3.  Stabilizing  incomes  of  producers  of livestock  products  at rea-
sonable  levels.
4.  Disposing  of surpluses.  This  problem  will  be  more and  more
influenced  by  questions  of  how,  in  the  interest  of  national
defense  and free  world  stability,  we can  use our great  agricul-
tural  productivity  more  effectively.
5.  Avoiding  continuous  production  of  surpluses. The problem  of
the  future  will  be  how  to  shape  and  trim  production  to  the
levels  needed  by society-within  the  democratic  framework  of
maximum  freedom  for  decision  making  by  farmers.
1.  Farmers' Prices and  Incomes
A  central-and  enormously  important-fact  of  agricultural  life  is
that  the  output  of  American  farms  is  continuing  to  increase  more
rapidly than our markets are expanding.  This is a  long-range phenome-
non,  not  one  of just  two  or  three years'  duration.  It is at  the  root  of
many  of our  price  and  income  problems  today.  And  it suggests  most
strongly  that  prices  and  incomes  will  continue  as  major  policy  prob-
lems in  agriculture  for many  years  ahead.
The  economics  of  the  basic  problem  here  are  relatively  simple:
A  price  below  the  equilibrium  level,  ceteris paribus, will  discourage
production;  a  price  above  the  level,  in  the  absence  of  effective  con-
trols,  will  produce  a  surplus  which  depresses  prices  and  incomes.  In
purely  economic  terms,  the  problems  involved  are  quite  capable  of
academic  solution.  This is the core of what economists,  as economists,
have  to  offer.  But  the  really  tough  part  of  these  problems  lies  in  the
area of public policy-in  achieving sufficient  focus of public  agreement
on  policies  to  be  followed,  and  in  the  development  of sufficiently  ac-
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in  the broadest  sense  of  that  term.  They  are  problems  of  education,
persuasion, compromise,  organization,  and power.
The  economist,  of  course,  must  be  aware  of  the  importance  of
achieving  such  focus  in  the  non-economic  area,  as  prerequisite  to
decision  and  action by a free society.  At the same  time, he  is justified
in  hoping  that  the  public's  decisions  and  actions  will  be  in  line  with
economic logic in the interest of both the farmer and the general public.
The imperative of this  is nowhere  more clearly demonstrated  than
in  our  current  situation  with respect  to  some  of the  so-called  "basic"
crops-crops that are storable  and are produced substantially  in excess
of  domestic  requirements,  under the impetus  of  price supports  which
encourage  overproduction.  In  this  case,  economic  logic  has  been
ignored,  excessive  stocks have  accumulated,  and  the  federal  agricul-
tural budget has risen above what appears to be a political equilibrium
level.
This  reflects  the  difficulties  of  achieving  workable  agreement  by
the public on practical  means of dealing  with the problems  before  us.
Agriculture  itself  is  not united  in  such  agreement,  which  means  the
agricultural  point  of  view  is  blurred  to the  relative  advantage  of  the
nonagricultural  point of view. It almost seems  that unity in agriculture
has  to  come  from  pain.  If this  is  true,  a  case  can  be  made  that  the
present disunity  in agriculture  is evidence  that not enough farmers  are
"hurting"  enough  on  the  price  and  income  front  to  submerge  their
differences  and make  common cause  of their problems.
2.  Rural  Poverty
As the American economy becomes ever more productive,  abysmal
and abject poverty will become increasingly a blemish  to be eradicated
from  any sector of  the  economy  in the name of  "respectability"  if for
no other reason.  Over  the years we have done  a lot of talking  and too
little  acting  about  the  problems  of  farm  labor  and  our  really  poor
farmers.  Our  most  significant  acting  has  generally  come  in  areas  of
national  policy  not  ordinarily  thought  of  as  "agricultural."  It  has
come in  the fields  of federal  and state aid to schools,  roads,  and nutri-
tion,  and  in  social  security,  as  well  as  in  labor  legislation.  More  re-
cently,  the  rural  development  program  has  provided  a  means  for
better focusing  attention on the agricultural  aspects of such problems,
especially  in the selected pilot counties.
But  greater  attention  to  these  matters  will  still  leave  unsolved
another  most difficult  problem-how  to protect  the  small  farmer  who
is  not  at the very  bottom of the  economic  pyramid  but is nevertheless
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unit,"  a  farm  too  small  to  provide  an  acceptable  income  even  when
farm prices  are  at reasonable  levels  nationally.  Should these  farms  be
left  unaided  to  adjust  their  size  under  competitive  pressures?  This  is
a really  tough  question  that  will  continue  to  be  raised  as  part  of the
general  problem  of  protecting  the  family  farm.
3.  Growing  Importance of Livestock  Issues
The  spotlight  in  agricultural  policy can  be  expected  to  shift more
to  the  feed  grain-livestock  complex  and away  from  commodities  with
which we  have historically  been  preoccupied-wheat,  cotton, rice,  and
tobacco.  This  will  happen  for  two  reasons:  (1)  All  but  one  of  the
really  important  issues  concerning  these  four  "basics,"  given  more
time, can and will be resolved  by the usual processes of negotiation and
economic  necessity,  and  (2)  the  programs for wheat  and  cotton have
contributed  to the  feed  grain-livestock  problem  which  will yield more
slowly to treatment.  By diverting wheat  and cotton acreage  to feed and
forage  crops,  the  wheat  and  cotton  programs  are  creating  a  feeling
of  loneliness  among  free-competition  livestock  producers  who  are
finding themselves  increasingly  isolated in a  sea of economic  stabiliza-
tion.
Producers  of tobacco,  rice,  cotton, and wheat now  have a program
that gives  them 70 percent  of parity  or better on all they  can grow on
substantial  acreage allotments. This program  is intended  to  meet their
needs  for  reasonable  stability  of  prices  and  incomes.  From  the  tax-
payers'  point  of view,  the  practical problem  is how  to persuade  these
particular  farmers  to  accept  something  that  costs  taxpayers  less  than
at  present,  but  without  returning  the  farmers  completely  to  the  free
world  market.  Somewhere  between  these  two  alternatives  a  com-
promise  will  be  reached,  and  it  cannot  wait  fifteen  years.  A  myriad
of  possibilities  are  available  for  reaching  a  compromise,  and  I  am
convinced  that  some  of these  actions will  be  taken.
When  this  happens,  the  problems  of most  of  the  "basics"  will be
nearer  solution  than  those  for  livestock  and  livestock  products.  In
saying this,  I  am aware  of another view  that  a bipartisan  urban oppo-
sition  is  likely  to throw  the  wheat  and  cotton  operators  on the mercy
of  the  world  market.  This  I doubt.  I  see  little  ground  for  supposing
that the  producers  of these  crops  will  ever  be  returned wholly  to  the
so-called  free  world  market.  To  believe  this  is  to  ignore  the  history
of  this  type  of  system.  Also,  our  foreign  friends  and  allies,  many  of
whom  now  have  farm  price  stabilization  programs  of  one  kind  or
another  of their own,  would  be  the first  to object.  We  now  live  in an
age  of intergovernmental  negotiation  of trade,  not "free"  trade.
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price advantage  they have had in the past,  the worst they  have  to fear
would be  some form  of "disaster"  supports;  and  they may be  able  to
get  something  much  better.  But  even  this  would  represent  "success"
rather  than "failure"  as compared  with no  program  at  all.  The  most
important  unresolved  issue  left would  be  the tendency  toward  surplus
production  of feed  grains.
We  are  now  rapidly  accumulating  surplus  inventories  of  feed
grains.  If we  decide  to produce  wheat for  feed  and  lower  feed  grain
price supports  to reduce government  costs,  and at the same time fail to
adjust  livestock  production  to needed  levels  or to  dispose  of  surplus
production on a large scale, feed will be cheaper and livestock products
generally  will be  cheaper-especially  at the farm.
The general  level  of livestock  production  and prices  is  affected  by
the  supply  and  prices  of  feed  grains.  The  problems  of  livestock  pro-
ducers  is  compounded  by  the  cyclical  nature  of  livestock  production
and prices.  Though  the technological  and organizational  revolution  in
agriculture  is  well  advanced  for  the  producers  of  field  crops  (true
agriculture  or  "field"  culture),  the  conversion  of  feed  into  livestock
products  has  been  rapidly  taking  on  characteristics  of  assembly-line
manufacturing.  It has periodically  put the broiler  producers  in a  state
of shock and crisis,  and  in some quarters  it is  feared that they will be
relegated  to  something  like  piece-worker  hired  hands.  Between  the
farm  producer  of feed  grains  and  the farm  producer  of livestock  and
livestock products  stands the feed mixing and manufacturing  industry.
Costs  of  feed  to  livestock  producers  who  buy  ready-mixed,  branded
feed  are  much  more  stable  than  to  those  who  buy  feed  grains  from
farmers and mix their own. Smoothing out price and production cycles
for livestock  products  is  another problem  in addition  to that  of main-
taining the general  level of livestock product prices. The latter problem
is  especially related to the supply and price  of farm feed grains.
The  supply and  price of hogs is  most closely  related to  the supply
and  price of feed  grains  because  most corn  is fed on  the farms  where
it  is grown.  Farmers  are  now on  the downside of the hog price cycle.
Based  on the past,  this can  be expected  to happen at least  twice more
during  the  next  fifteen  years,  and  hog  producers  will not  like  it.  On
the  same  basis,  cattle  producers  will  read  at  least  one  more  chapter
in their economic  lesson.  An earlier one was read in 1952.  Before  the
next  fifteen  years  pass,  they  can expect  to  see  the price  "trough"  of
still  another  cycle.
The chronic  complaints  of producers  of manufacturing  milk  stem
partly  from  the  competition  of  soybean,  cotton,  and  corn  oil,  often
grown  on the same farms  as those  producing butterfat.  This competi-
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prices,  partly through  marketing  orders  and partly  through price  sup-
port  for  manufacturing  milk.  Even  so,  the  number  of farms  keeping
milk  cows  is  continuing  to  shrink,  and  the  average  size of  herds  and
production  per  cow  is  continuing  to  increase.  As meat  animal  prices
sag during  the  peaks of  their  production  cycles,  milk  production will
tend  to  expand  at current  price-support  levels.  Thus,  the  feed  grain-
livestock  problems  will  continue  to  be the  most  difficult  problems  to
solve  and  will  attract  relatively  more  public  attention.
4.  Expansion  of  Welfare  and National  Security  Programs
Experience  demonstrates that the disposal of surpluses  seems to be
a  more  acceptable  alternative  than  tighter  production  controls.  This
is  because  a  majority  of  us  still  hold  Quesnay's  original  concept  of
use value  instead  of his other  concept  of exchange  value.  This  is  due
to  the  fact  that  somewhere  are  people  who need even  if  they  cannot
demand  all  that  is  being  produced.  We  have,  therefore,  literally
"backed"  into  certain  public  programs  and policies  which  are  gaining
supporters  for reasons  of their  own,  quite unrelated  to the problem  of
surplus  disposal.  Public  authority  is  deciding  that  the  improvement
of nutrition among school  children  is a worthy public purpose  regard-
less  of  whether  farmers  are  producing  a  surplus  of any  one healthful
food  such  as  milk.
Similarly,  national  security  as  well  as  humanity  demands  that  we
use our  great productivity  as  much  as possible  to help narrow  the gap
between  the  well-being  of people  in  advanced  economies  and  that  of
people  in  lesser  developed  nations.  For  this  reason  we  are  hearing
more and  more  about  "Food for Peace"  and  other such programs.  In
the  absence  of  a  hot  war  we shall  hear still  more about  this  question
in  the next  fifteen  years,  and our  words  may even  be  more and  more
translated  into  deeds.
5.  Better Balance  Between  Supply  and  Demand
But after allowing  for the expansion  in demand from  these uses  of
food  and  other  agricultural  raw  materials  as  well  as  for  the  expected
expansion  in domestic  private demand,  it seems  probable that our bur-
geoning technology  will still cause supplies to press against demand-at
least periodically  and for individual  commodities.
Since the  early twenties,  the  peacetime  national  farm  problem has
been that the American commercial  farm plant has produced more than
could  be sold on  the free market at prices  considered  fair  by farmers.
Ever since the passage  of the Agricultural  Marketing  Act of  1929, this
diagnosis has been  at least tactily accepted  by the public generally.  The
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I think is  permanent.  In making that turn,  the federal government  has
veered away  from  a strict  "laissez-faire"  policy in agriculture  in  favor
of a "reasonable"  capitalism.
Throughout all the years of efforts  to deal with surpluses the nation
has been confronted  with two  principal alternatives  or some  combina-
tion thereof:  ( 1) It could try to control supply so that a surplus would
either not be produced  or not be marketed,  and  (2)  it could try to dis-
pose  of the  surplus  either  by distribution  in  noncommercial  channels
or by creating  a  government  demand  for it and distributing  it through
commercial  channels.  At  no  time  has  the  alternative  of evading the
whole  problem  by  returning  producers  of  "basics"  completely  to  the
free world market been available.  Price supports have been lowered but
not enough  to prevent  the accumulation  of surpluses.  We have  moved
by various measures to control output and  to dispose of surpluses after
they  were  produced,  but  as  of  today  both  types  of action  are  falling
short of what is needed at the legislated  support-price  levels.
No doubt support levels in the future will be changed in response to
technological  and other economic  changes.  Questions  will  still remain,
however,  regarding  how  to  do  a  better job  of both  disposing  of  sur-
pluses and of avoiding their recurrence.  As John  Brewster has  already
told you, widely held "value judgments"  are in conflict with "controls,"
especially controls  by government.  These  "value judgments"  guide our
lives, and in large measure they govern our agricultural programs.  How-
ever, they do change over time. Apparently,  in cases where controls  are
being used successfully,  the critical test of their acceptability  is whether
they "work."  This attitude might be expected to grow as the size of farm
enterprises  grows,  the  number  of farms  shrinks,  and  farmers  become
more "business-minded."
We have  already  had substantial  experience  with efforts  to  control
supply  through  acreage  allotments  and  marketing  quotas.  Almost  al-
ways, however,  these have been  types  of controls based on the assump-
tion  that  the  problem  was  temporary  and  would  disappear  once  the
"emergency"  had passed.  We  have  already had  substantial  experience
with  the migration  of large  numbers  of farm people  to  the  city,  while
total agricultural production increases faster than market outlets. Thus,
the primary unsolved peacetime  policy problem for the future remains:
How  can  we balance  farm  supplies  with  demand  at reasonable  prices
and absorb  the prospective  further great  advances  in agricultural  tech-
nology?  Thus far, we have shown little promise of doing so by reducing
acres in cultivation or by attracting farm people to the cities. The people
who  remain  on  the  land  merely  operate  bigger  and  more  productive
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threat Quesnay  once thought  to be a logical impossibility.
RELATED  QUESTIONS
The  technological  causes  of  these  changes  are  creating  other  re-
lated,  if not major,  agricultural  policy questions.  An expanding  urban
population  is being dispersed to the countryside  and suburban areas  by
the  automobile  and  fine highways;  and,  together  with the  inflationary
threat powered  by defense expenditures  and other causes, it is changing
the  farmer's  position  as  landlord  and  as  participant  in  local  govern-
mental  affairs.
The landowning farmer has seen his real estate value per acre more
than  double  since World  War II.  But in  all suburban  areas,  a part of
the price he is paying for this increase  in his asset position is the stresses
and strains of adjusting  local tax,  zoning,  educational,  and  other gov-
ernmental policies to the needs of nonfarm people who are increasingly
outnumbering him.
IN  RETROSPECT
If we view the long sweep of national agricultural policy during the
nearly  sixty  years  of  the  20th  century,  we  will  see  that  it  falls  into
three  distinct  periods of about twenty  years each.  Prior to  1920 it was
concerned  primarily  with  the  improvement  of  agricultural  technology
through  research  and  education.  We  viewed  prospective  demand  as
practically  unlimited;  hence,  the  agricultural  problem  was  essentially
one of improving  the efficiency  ratio on individual farms,  measured  as
output per unit of input.
From  1920  to  1940 we  were  primarily  concerned  with  prices,  or
the  scarcity  ratio  of supply  to  demand  measured  in  dollars.  Whereas
before  1920  we were preoccupied  with improving  producing power,  in
the  twenties  and thirties  bargaining  power  was  the  primary  object  of
our attention.  Although we had already participated  in one world war,
we remained  isolationist during most of the latter  period, secure in the
conviction  that the greatest  welfare  of each individual and each nation
was  to be found in following self-interest in a freely competitive  world.
The  forties  and fifties  were  decades  of successive  world-wide  revo-
lutions,  and  whether  we liked  it or  not we have had to  join the rest of
the world and become international minded. No industry of the size and
diversity  of American  agriculture  can  boast of  increasing  its  produc-
tivity more than enough since  1940 to release one-third of its manpower
to  other  occupations.  This  progress  was  made  possible  partly  by  the
agricultural  policies  followed  in  the  previous  forty  years.  In no  small
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the  Department  of Agriculture  and  the land-grant  colleges-a  system
still active and promising still greater future  accomplishments.
Nor have many countries,  if any, done  more since  1940 to protect
its farmers' incomes from the vicissitudes  of the "free market"  than the
United States.
AGRICULTURAL  POLICY  EDUCATION
Caught between  the  upper  and  nether millstones  of political  neu-
trality  and  orthodox  economic  doctrine,  the extension  economist,  as
economist,  has  undertaken  the  difficult  task  of  educating  farmers  on
what they  ought  to do about agricultural policy.
In educational work in the field of natural science, public employees
do not hesitate to tell a farmer what he ought to do individually or col-
lectively,  but in the field of agricultural policy  (social  science)  they are
under strong  pressure  to  stop  short  of prescription  and  confine  their
efforts  to presenting what is called "the probable  consequences of alter-
native courses of action." This is one very significant application of the
meaning  of the  term  "institutional  economics."  More power  to  you in
your  difficult job.
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